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ANTI- HARASSMENT PROVISIONS REVISITED:

N0

BRIGHT-LINE RULE

Martha McCarthy*
Considerable attention in education and legal circles has
focused on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Morse u.
Frederick.l While this ruling answers some questions
regarding students' expression rights, it provides little
clarification about challenges to public school districts' policies
or practices prohibiting harassing and demeaning expression.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court passed up a recent
opportunity to provide guidance in this arena when it vacated
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harper u. Poway Unified School
District without addressing the merits of the case.2 In the
absence of clear Supreme Court guidance, lower court rulings
in cases challenging such anti-harassment restrictions are
difficult to reconcile with each other and with student
expression litigation in general. These cases are particularly
sensitive because they highlight the tension between the
protection of students' First Amendment rights to freely
express their views, including religious views, and school
authorities' duty to maintain a respectful and civil school
environment. Recent legal developments have left educators
unsure regarding how to balance public schools' obligations and
students' rights in terms of appropriate and protected
expression in public schools.
This Article revisits cases rendered since 2000 challenging
school districts' anti-harassment restrictions. In Section I, the
Supreme Court's rulings on students' free speech rights are
briefly reviewed to provide a context regarding the governing
legal principles. Section II examines two rulings of the Third
Circuit as an example of how lower courts have applied
• Chancellor's Professor and Chair, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies,
Indiana University.
1. 127 S. Ct. 261H (2007).
2. 445 F.3d 1Hi6 (9th Cir. 2006). vacated and remanded with instructions to
dismiss as moot. 127 S. Ct. 14H4 (2007).
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Supreme Court precedent to challenges to anti-harassment
policies. Sections III and IV, respectively, discuss the
inconsistencies among lower court rulings across circuits
regarding displays of the Confederate flag and expressions of
religious beliefs that demean homosexuality. Section V
addresses possible future directions of litigation in this arena
and reviews the meager guidance for school authorities that
can be gleaned from the cases to date.
I. CONTEXT: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Since the late 1960s, the Supreme Court has rendered four
decisions directly addressing public school students' free
expression rights.:l The legal principles established in these
cases are briefly reviewed below because lower courts apply
these principles in assessing current challenges to school
districts' anti-harassment policies.
The seminal decision, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,4 marked the Supreme Court's
entry into the arena of constitutional protection of students'
expression rights. The Supreme Court in Tinker declared that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"fi and "may not be
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are
officially approved."6 Tinker focused on disciplinary action
against students who wore black armbands to protest the
Vietnam War in violation of a school board policy that was
enacted after the district's principals learned that the students

:i. Sec Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 261H (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (l98H); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:3 v. Frn.sm', 478 U.S. 67fi
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :39:3 U.S. fiO:l (1969). The Court
also has addressed studlmt expression rights under thl' Federal Equal Access Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000), and in connection with students attending state-supported
institutions of higher education. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ.
ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (HJ9fi) (holding that a university could not withhold support from a
student religious group seeking to use student activity funds to publish sectarian
materials): Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. Dist. fi6 v. MPrgens. 496 U.S. 226
(1990) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the Ft•cheral Equal Access Act.
which stipulates that federally assisted secondary schools with a limited forum for
student groups to mPPt during noninstructional time cannot denY school access to
noncurriculum student groups based on the religious, philosophical. or political content
of their meetings).
4. 39:3 U.S. fiO:l (1969).
5. Id. at 506.
6. Id. at 511.
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planned to engage in this form of passive, silent protest. 7 In
holding for the students, the Court in Tinker ruled that
students can express their private ideological views at school
unless such expression threatens a "substantial disruption" of
the educational process or collides with the rights of others.i-l
The Supreme Court did not deliver another studentexpression decision until 1986, and this ruling, Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser,9 narrowed the circumstances under
which Tinker applies. In Fraser, the Court granted school
authorities considerable discretion in curtailing expression
they consider to be lewd and vulgar.lO Reversing the courts
below, the Supreme Court upheld a student's suspension for
using a sexual metaphor in a nominating speech during a
student government assembly.ll The Court concluded that
sexual innuendos could offend both teachers and students even
though the expression did not cause a disruption.12 Declaring
that "[s]urely it is a highly appropriate function of public school
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in
public discourse,"l :J the Fraser majority found it "perfectly
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the
point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is
wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public
school education."l4 The Court further stated that the school
board is the proper body to determine what manner of student
speech is appropriate in classrooms and assemblies.15
In 1988, only two years after rendering Fraser, the
Supreme Court delivered its third decision, Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, drawing a distinction between schoolsponsored and private student expression.l6 The controversy
focused on a high school principal's deletion of two pages from
the school newspaper because of the content of articles on
divorce and teenage pregnancy and concerns that individuals

'.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
1:1.
14.
15.
16.

!d. at 604.
/d.at51:i14.
,178 U.S. 67R (1986).
/d. at 68:3--86.
/d. at 677-78. 687.
Sec id. at 68:!.
/d. at 68:3.
/d. at 685-8fi.
!d. at 68:1.
484 U.S. 260. 270-71 (191:'8).
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could be identified in the articles.17 Upholding the principal's
actions, the Supreme Court declared "that educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."lk The Court
rejected the assertion that the school newspaper had been
established as a public forum for student expression, reasoning
that school authorities must exhibit a clear intent for school
activities to become a public forum.l!-l Conceding that public
schools at times must tolerate private student expression to
respect constitutional guarantees, the Court emphasized that
school authorities can censor student speech that represents
the school.20 The Court declared that a school does not have to
condone student speech appearing to bear the school's
imprimatur if it is inconsistent with the school's '"basic
educational mission,' even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school."21
The above trilogy of Supreme Court decisions was applied
by lower courts in assessing student expression rights for
almost two decades until the Court rendered its fourth decision
in 2007, Morse u. Frederick.22 The Court in Morse held that
given the special circumstances in public schools, students can
be disciplined for expression reasonably viewed as promoting or
celebrating illegal drug use.23 This case attracted substantial
national attention and focused on a banner containing the
phrase, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS," which plaintiff Joseph
Frederick and some friends unfurled across the street from
their school as the Olympic torch relay passed by.24 After
Frederick refused to lower the banner, the principal confiscated
it and subsequently suspended Frederick.25 The Court declined
to apply legal standards used to assess students' off-campus

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

al 26:'3.
at 27:3.
at 269-70.
at 270-71.
at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:) v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675. 685

(1986)).
22. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
23. Id. at 2629.
24. Id. at 2622.

25.

Id.
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behavior, because the students were under the school's control
when they were allowed to go outside on the public sidewalk to
watch the torch relay.26
Reversing the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the school
could not censor non-disruptive, off-campus student speech
that conveyed "a social message contrary to the one favored by
the school" during a school-authorized event,27 the Supreme
Court upheld disciplinary action for display of the banner,
which the principal viewed as promoting illegal drug use.28 The
majority emphasized the importance of deterring drug use by
schoolchildren and concluded that Frederick's action violated
the school board's policy prohibiting expression advocating use
of illegal substances.29 The Court declared that Fraser stands
for the propositions that (1) the public school is a special
environment in terms of expression rights, and (2)
considerations beyond the Tinker disruption standard are
appropriate in assessing student expression in public schools.30
However, a majority of the justices declined to extend school
authorities' discretion to allow them to curtail any student
expression they find plainly offensive:n or at odds with the
school's educational mission,32 which would allow school
officials too much discretion. All of the justices agreed that
students can be disciplined for promoting the use of illegal
drugs, but they differed regarding whether the banner at issue
actually did so.:3:3
The legal principles established by the Supreme Court in

26. Id. at 2624.
27. Frederick v. Morse, 4:l9 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006).
28. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622-23.
29. Id. at 2628-29.
30. Id. at 2626-27. All the justices agreed that the principal should not be held
liable for violating clearly established law; Justice Breyer thought the decision should
have focused only on this issue. See id. at 2641 (Breyer, .J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (stating that if the case had been decided on qualified immunity
grounds. and not First Amendment grounds, the decision would have been unanimous
because even the dissent agreed that the principal was not liable for damages).
:n. Id. at 2629.
32. Id. at 26:17 (Alito, ,J., joined by Kennedy. J., concurring) (Justices Alito and
Kennedy emphasized that this decision does not extend to other political or social
issues that may be viewed as inconsistent with the school's mission). Since the
legalization of marijuana has been controversial in Alaska, perhaps if the banner had
been cast as advocating a change in state law. Frederick would have prevailed.
33. See id. at 2646-47, 2649 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsberg & Souter, JJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that the banner was a nonsensical effort to get on television and
promoted nothing).
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these cases govern student expression rights, but lower courts
have not spoken with a single voice in interpreting and
applying these standards. The principles seem particularly
difficult to apply in litigation involving religious challenges to
school districts' anti-harassment provisions.:14
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT DRAWS ATTENTION TO ANTIHARASSMENT POLICIES

Prior to the twenty-first century, it was generally assumed
that school authorities could curtail harassing student
expression and that it was legitimate for public schools to enact
anti-harassment policies as part of their obligation to instill
basic values in students and maintain a proper environment
for learning.35 A distinction was drawn between higher
education, where students are more mature and choose to
enroll, and the vulnerable captive student bodies in public
elementary and secondary schools. Whereas some policies
restricting hate speech have been struck down in
postsecondary institutions,36 the conventional wisdom has been
that public schools have greater discretion to curtail such
disrespectful and hurtful expression, beyond that actionable
under civil rights laws,37 to fulfill their obligation to inculcate
essential values in a democratic society.3S
The Third Circuit attracted national attention in 2001
when it rendered its decision in Saxe v. State College Area
School District (SCASD), reversing the court below and
striking down a Pennsylvania school district's anti-harassment
policy that prohibited disrespectful expression considered a
threat to the school environment and individual well-being.:39
The SCASD policy defined "harassment" as "verbal or physical
conduct based on one's actual or perceived race, religion, color,

:H. See infra text accompanying notes 46-55 and 112- l:lS.
:l5. See CHAI{LJ<:S A. BEARD, MARY R. BEARD & WILLIAM BEARD, NI.:W BASIC
HISTORY OF TilE UNITim STATES 228 (1960); Martha McCarthy, Anti-Hamssment
Policies in Public Schools: How Vulnerable Are They?, :n ,J. L. & Eouc. 52 (2002).
:16. See, e.g. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ .. 55 F.:id 1177 (6th Cir. 199;)): UW:\1
Post Inc. v. Ed. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 116:3 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
:37. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. ~ 2000d (2000): Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S. C. ~ H5R l (2000): infra text
accompanying note 46.
::ls. McCarthy, supra note 35, at 5fi.
:l9. 240 F.::ld 200 (:id Cir. 2001), rev g. 77 F. Supp. 2d 621. 6:27 (M.D. l'a. 19~)9).
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national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other
personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with a student's educational
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment."40 The policy covered unwelcome conduct
offending or belittling others based on any of the above
factors41 and defined the category of "other harassment" as
harassment on the basis of such things as "clothing, physical
appearance, social skills, peer group, income, intellect,
educational program, hobbies or values, etc.," that may
substantially
interfere
with
a
student's
educational
performance or create "an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment." 42
The SCASD policy was challenged by plaintiffs who feared
reprisals for voicing their religious views about moral issues,
including the distribution of religious literature describing the
harmful effects of homosexuality. 4:3 The Third Circuit reversed
the decision of the court below in a ruling authored by Justice
Alito before his confirmation to the Supreme Court.
Recognizing
that
"preventing
discrimination
in
the
workplace-and in the schools-is not only a legitimate, but a
compelling, government interest" and that "speech may be
more readily subject to restrictions" in schools that have a
captive audience, 44 the Third Circuit nonetheless found the
SCASD policy unconstitutionally overbroad.45 The appeals
court reviewed existing anti-discrimination laws and litigation
in detail to refute the district court's conclusion that the antiharassment policy simply barred expression already prohibited
by legislation.46 Instead, the Third Circuit found some

40.

!d. at 202 (quoting SCASD Anti-Harassment Policy. General Statement of
para. 2 (approved Aug. 9, 1999), inclnded in Saxe. 240 F.:ld app. at 21t~-2:l
[hereinafter General Statement]).
41. General Statement, at para. 4.
42. SCASD Anti-Harassment Policy, Definitions, para. 9 (approved Aug. 9, HJ99),
inclnded in Saxe, 240 F.:Jd app. at 220. The court faulted thP school district for
addressing what constitutes prohibited expression in separate passages of the policy.
as they arguably could be interpreted as providing different definitions of the hamll'd
speech. Saxe. 240 F.3d at 215.
4::l. See Saxe, 240 F.:3d at 203.
44. !d. at 209-10.
45. !d. at 217.
4!i. See id. at 204-()(i (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. fi29
(1999): Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993): Meritor Sav. Bank. FSB v.
Vinson. ·177 U.S. 57 (19H6)). While recognizing that individuals can challc>nge

Policy.
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expression covered by the SCASD policy to be beyond what is
actionable under federal civil rights laws. The appeals court
considered the policy's catch-all category, barring harassment
based on "other personal characteristics," particularly
troublesome and likely to encompass some protected
expression.47 Also, the court reasoned that harassing
expression based on values "strikes at the heart of moral and
political discourse," which is a "core concern of the First
Amendment." 48
Rejecting the assertion that harassing speech is beyond
constitutional protection, the Third Circuit found no judicial
precedent supporting a "categorical rule that divests
'harassing' speech, as defined by federal anti-discrimination
statutes, of First Amendment protection."49 And even if such a
contention were true, the appeals court emphasized that the
SCASD policy would be struck down because its reach was
broader than any anti-discrimination laws.50
The Third Circuit turned to First Amendment expresswn
cases involving public school students toward the end of its
opmwn, acknowledging that offensive expression can be
curtailed for schoolchildren that could not be restricted for
adults.51 The court reasoned that Hazelwood was not
controlling, because the policy did not regulate schoolsponsored expression.52 Also declining to apply Fraser, the
court appeared to confine the Fraser principle to a
consideration of the form and manner of expression rather than
its substance, even though it did recognize that under Fraser
school districts can categorically prohibit private student
expression that is lewd, vulgar, or profane.5:3 But the Third
Circuit stated that the unconstitutional SCASD policy

harassment based on sex, race. color, national origin, age, and disability under federal
civil rights laws. the court emphasized that when these anti discrimination laws
regulate expression based on content or viewpoint, such a "n~striction is ordinarily
subject to the most exacting First Amendment scrutiny." ld. at 207.
47. Id.at210.
48. ld.
49.

50.
51.
(Hl86)).
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 214.
ld. at 212-13 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
See id. at 216.
Id.
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regulated expression far broader than "Fraser-type speech."54
Thus, the court reasoned that the speech at issue was governed
by Tinker's disruption standard, which the anti-harassment
policy did not satisfy.55
In a subsequent decision rendered a year later, Sypniewski
u. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, a different panel
of the Third Circuit upheld a school policy barring racial
harassment.56 Unlike the policy in Saxe, the contested policy in
Sypniewski had been enacted in response to a pattern of racial
incidents.57 During the 2000-2001 school year, some high
school students wore clothing displaying the Confederate flag
as a symbol of their solidarity when they observed what they
called "White Power Wednesday."58 The school board had
previously discussed a ban on clothing displaying the
Confederate flag but declined to enact such a ban until 2001.59
The policy adopted was one that had been upheld by the Tenth
Circuit, and it banned various manifestations of racial
harassment or intimidation.60
The Warren Hills policy was challenged as being
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face.61 Rejecting
these assertions, the appeals court reasoned that the policy,
limited to racially provocative expression, was an appropriate
nondiscriminatory response by school officials to the history of
racial tensions in the school district (e.g., students observing
White Power Wednesdays, writing racist graffiti on school
walls, engaging in verbal racial harassment, and displaying
Confederate flags).62 The Third Circuit recognized that
although public schools can regulate racially hostile conduct
that is disruptive in the absence of an anti-harassment policy,
such policies can be helpful in guiding student behavior.63 The
court was not persuaded that the content restriction (applying
only to racially offensive content) was unconstitutional, given

54. Id.
55. Id.at21G-17.
56. 307 F.:3d 24:3 (:ld Cir. 2002).
57. Id. at 246-4il.
58. Id. at 24 7.
59. /d. at 248-49.
60. Id. at 249; see also West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260. 206 F.3d 1358
(lOth Cir. 2000); infra text accompanying note 74.
61. Sypniewski, 307 F.:ocl at 252.
62. See id. at 2GO-G2.
63. Id. at 259-GO.
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the well-founded fear of racial conflict in the school district.64
The Third Circuit declared:
Speech that disrupts education, causes disorder, or
inappropriately interferes with other students' rights may be
proscribed or regulated. Everyday school discipline does not
depend on the necessity of a speech code. In the public school
setting, the First Amendment protects the nondisruptive
expression of ideas. It does not erect a shield that handicaps
the proper functioning of the public schools.65

Even though the policies in Sypniewski and Saxe shared
some language, the Sypniewski court found the Warren Hills
policy to be sufficiently narrower than the SCASD policy and to
address different circumstances.66 However, one aspect of the
Warren Hills policy was struck down. The Third Circuit ruled
that speech creating "ill will" could be broadly interpreted as
going beyond a link to a disruption required under Tinker, so
school authorities were ordered to eliminate this phrase from
the policy.67 Unlike the Saxe appellate panel that did not offer
school authorities the option of severing the overly broad
provisions from the SCASD policy, the Third Circuit panel in
Sypniewski was satisfied that the Warren Hills policy could be
implemented with the one phrase eliminated.6S
While upholding the anti-harassment policy in Sypniewski,
the Third Circuit ruled that T-shirts with Jeff Foxworthy's
redneck sayings on them did not violate the policy.69 The school
contended that the shirts abridged the racial harassment policy
and the school's dress code, but there was no allegation that
the shirts were indecent or lewd.70 Thus, the Third Circuit
applied the disruption standard articulated in Tinker and
found that banning the shirts in question violated the students'
rights in the absence of a disruption. 71 Although a gang-like
group, "the Hicks," was associated with racist behavior, the

fi4. Id. at :!fi:2
65. Id. at 2ii~ (citation omitted).
fi6. Id. at. 2fil-G2.
fi7. ld. at 262· fi6.
GH. ld. at 2fi:l. 265-66.
G~.

Id. at 2fi~.
70. Id. at 2ii4. The pertinent part of the dress code prohibits "[c]lothing displaying
or imprinted wtt.h nudity, vulgarity. obscenity, profanity, double entendre pictures or
slogans (including those rPlatPd to alcohol, drugs and tobacco), or portraying racial,
ethnic. or religious stereotyping." Id. at 200 n.6.
71. ld. at 2:)4.
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court concluded that the connection between the Hicks and
redneck sayings was ambiguous at best.72 Therefore, even
though the anti-harassment policy was upheld, school
authorities' judgment in enforcing the policy in this particular
instance was overruled. 73

III. CHALLENGES TO DISPLAYS OF THE CONFEDERATE FLAG
HIGHLIGHT THE RANGE OF LOWEI\ COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A number of cases in addition to Sypniewski have focused
at least in part on displays of the Confederate flag by public
school students. Indeed, much of the litigation pertaining to
anti-harassment policies in the past decade has addressed such
displays. The Supreme Court has not accepted an appeal in any
of these cases, and lower courts have differed widely in their
application of Supreme Court precedent, rendering a range of
opinions. These different interpretations present challenges
when school districts try to implement acceptable policies.
In a 2000 decision, West v. Derby Unified School District
No. 260, the Tenth Circuit held that a Kansas school district's
anti-harassment policy met the Tinker standard and upheld
disciplinary action against a middle school student for drawing
a Confederate flag during math class in violation of the
policy. 74 The school district's policy prohibited racial
harassment or intimidation "by name calling, using racial or
derogatory slurs, wearing or possession of items depicting or
implying racial hatred or prejudice," including items that
denote the Ku Klux Klan, White Supremacy, Black Power,
Confederate flags, or articles of any hate groups, such as the
Neo-Nazis. 75 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the school
district had reason to believe the display of the Confederate
flag could lead to racial incidents that might cause a school
disruption and interfere with the rights of others.76
The same year that West was rendered, the Eleventh
Circuit in Denno v. School Board of Volusia County, Florida
rejected a student's claim that disciplinary action for displaying
72. ld. at 255~56.
7:3. ld. at 269.
71. 206 F.3d 1:3513 (lOth Cir. 2000).
75. ld. at 1361.
7ti. !d. at 1366.
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the Confederate flag warranted liability against school officials
and the school board. 77 The Florida student displayed a small
Confederate flag to his friends as they were discussing Civil
War history during an outdoor lunch break. The assistant
principal saw the flag and instructed Denno to put it away.
When Denno attempted to explain the historical significance of
the flag. the assistant principal ordered him to go to the
administrative office and on the way informed Denno that he
would be suspended from school. 78 Relying primarily on Fraser
rather than Tinker, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a
"flexible reasonableness or balancing standard" should be used
to assess restrictions on student expression in such cases. 79
The court granted qualified immunity to the school officials,
concluding that they did not violate clearly established law;
they reasonably could believe that the display could be
prohibited because Confederate flags are highly offensive to
some individuals and implicate "legitimate school functions
relating to civility."HO
In a more recent decision, Scott u. School Board of Alachua
County, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of the school's ban
of the Confederate flag where there were racial tensions in the
school.Sl The Eleventh Circuit upheld the suspension of two
students who displayed Confederate flags on school premises in
defiance of the principal's instructions.82 Among other things,
the students alleged that the threat of a racial disturbance was
insufficient to justify the principal's unwritten ban.83 The court
found the Confederate flag disruptive under Tinker but also
concluded that, even in the absence of a likely disruption,
school officials under Fraser have a duty to inculcate civil,
respectful behavior and expression.84 The court acknowledged
the debate over whether the Confederate flag should be
considered offensive only if intended to be so or whether the
flag is "innately offensive" because "it is perceived as offensive

77. 218 F.:3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000).
78. ld. at 1270-71.
79. ld. at 127:l 74.
80. ld. at 1274 7fi.
81. :324 F.:3d 1246 (11th Cir. 200:3).
82. ld. at 1247.
83. See id.
84. !d. at 124H.
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by so many people."H5 Nonetheless, the appeals court concluded
that school authorities are expected to ban the display of
symbols of racial prejudice and to teach students with different
backgrounds to interact in civil terms.86
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit in D.B. ex rel. Brogdon v. Lafon
also broadly interpreted the authority of school personnel when
it upheld a school district's ban on students displaying the
Confederate flag.87 The court found the potential for such
displays to be disruptive, and it rejected the students'
contention
that
the
ban
represented
viewpoint
discrimination.ss The school district's dress code prohibits,
among other things, clothing exhibiting references to illegal
substances, negative slogans, or vulgarities or that would cause
a disruption.S9 Although the court found "ample reason" for
school authorities to anticipate a disruption from students
wearing the banned symbol,90 the court stated that evidence of
such a disruption would not be necessary to uphold the
prohibition.91 The court declared that Tinker does not require
substantiation of "a preexisting incident of the banned symbol
evoking disruption."92 Noteworthy is the fact that the dress
code policy barred "negative slogans," a term that can be
interpreted in multiple ways, but this phrase was not
challenged in the case.93
In contrast, the same appeals court a few years earlier in
Castorina ex rel Rewt v. Madison County School Board had
struck down restrictions on displaying the Confederate flag in
the absence of the threat of a disruption.94 The Sixth Circuit
reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the
school district in connection with the district's ban of the
Confederate flag on clothing and overturned the suspension of
students for violating the ban by wearing T-shirts with a
country singer on the front and the Confederate flag on the

85. !d.

fl6. !d. at 1249.
81. 217 Fed. Appx. R1H (6th Cir. 2007).
88. Id. R.t :024.
89. Id. R.t :021.
90. !d. at :02:0.
91. See id. at :02:0.
92. Id.
93. !d. at 521.
94. 246 F.:id R:if) (6th Cir. 2001).
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back.95 The principal had instructed the two students to
change their shirts because they were in violation of the dress
code that in part prohibits attire that has "racist
implications."96 When the students refused to comply, their
parents were called and informed that if the students would go
home and change their shirts, they would not be disciplined.97
The parents supported their children's decision not to change
their shirts, and after two suspensions for wearing the shirts,
the students withdrew from school and were home-schooled for
the remainder of the year.98 They brought suit, and the district
court dismissed the students' claims, but the appeals court
reversed.99 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the students wore
the shirts to express a viewpoint (celebrating their southern
heritage and Hank Williams' birthday).100 The court applied
Tinker in reaching its decision, noting that the school did not
produce evidence of racial tension in the school or that the
plaintiffs' conduct would likely lead to violence or any other
disruption.l OJ Moreover, the court concluded that the school
board had enforced the dress code in an uneven and viewpointspecific manner. For example, clothing with iron crosses and
venerating Malcom X had been allowed.l02 Thus, the students
prevailed in establishing a violation of their free speech
rights.lO:l
Other courts also have ruled in favor of students' rights to
display the Confederate flag, finding that prohibitions impair
their free expression rights. For example, in Bragg v. Swanson,
a West Virginia federal district court found a school's policy
prohibiting the display of the Confederate flag as a symbol of
racism to be unconstitutionally overbroad under the First
Amendment.l04 Therefore, a student was successful m
!d.
!d. at s:m.
!d. at 5:39.
!d.
I d.
100. !d. at ;):19.
101. !d. at fi44.
102. !d. at 540-41.
103. !d. at 544.
104. 371 F. Supp. 2cl 814 (S.D. W.Va. 2005). The school district's policy manual did
not mention the Confederate f1ag. However, based on a request from the faculty,
coupled with the principal's negative experiences with displays of the flag at other
schools, the principal draftpd a dress code enforcemfmt policy for the school. The
relevant aspect of this policy stated: "Profanity, vulgarity, sexual innuendo, and racist
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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challenging disciplinary action for wearing the flag on aT-shirt
and belt buckle. The court reasoned that display of the
Confederate f1ag per se is not patently offensive,105 noting that
the student had a strong sense of his southern background and
wore the emblems to reflect this heritage.106 Moreover, the
court recognized that the student had worn the clothing for
three years without incident and that only when the new
principal expanded the dress code in an enforcement policy did
it become an issue.107 Reasoning that Tinker's disruption
standard governed this case, the court noted that the policy
was overbroad in prohibiting some attire that was not racially
offensive and found no evidence of the banned attire leading to
a disruption.lOH According to this court, a prohibition on
displaying the Confederate flag simply because some people
associate it with racism was insufficient justification.109 Thus,
the school district was ordered to expunge from the student's
record any notation of disciplinary action and was enjoined
from enforcing the overbroad portion of the policy barring
offensive language or symbols, defined as including racist
language or symbols such as the Confederate flag.llO
The body of litigation involving challenges to student
displays of the Confederate f1ag reflects different views across
jurisdictions, and the Supreme Court has declined to clarify the
governing legal principles. It appears that the courts applying
Fraser generally rule in favor of the school authorities, whereas
those applying Tinker tend to uphold the students' rights
unless there is clear evidence of racial conflict within the
school. However, as revisited in the concluding section, the
circumstances that trigger each standard remain somewhat
unclear.

language and/or symbols or graphics are prohibited. This includes items displaying the
Rebel [Confederate! flag, which has been used as a symbol of racism at high schools in
Putnam County." !d. at H1H.
106. See ld. at H27.
106. Id. at H20.
107. Id. at 819-20.
l 08. !d. at H27.
109. ld. at H2H-29.
110. Id. at 829.
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IV. PROHIBITIONS ON DEMEANING EXPRESSION BASED ON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION: DOES TINKER'S SECOND PRONG HAVE
TEETH?
Controversies that pit free exercise and free speech rights
against prohibitions on harassing and demeaning expression
based on sexual orientation have proven particularly volatile.
As discussed above, the Third Circuit focused attention on this
topic in Saxe when it struck down a school district's antiharassment policy as overbroad, ruling in favor of a student
who claimed that he could not express his religious beliefs
about homosexuality because of the school district's policy.111
More recently, an Ohio student prevailed in challenging
school administrators' actions prohibiting him from wearing a
shirt denigrating homosexuality, Islam, and abortion.l12
Rejecting the school administrators' assertion that the shirt
was "plainly offensive" in violation of the principle articulated
by the Supreme Court in Fraser, the federal district court
reasoned that Fraser governs the manner and not the content
of expression.l1:3 Applying Tinker's disruption standard, the
court found no interference with the educational process or
evidence that the shirt might cause such a disruption in the
future.ll4 The court also rejected the contention that the
expression interfered with the rights of others in violation of
Tinker.ll5 The court found the mere fact that some classmates
might be offended to be insufficient to justify the school's
prohibition on wearing the shirt.ll6 The court declared that no
cases had turned on Tinker's second prong-allowing
censorship of student expression that collides with the rights of
others-as the controlling legal principle.ll7 However, that

111. Saxe v. State Coil. Area Sch. Dist. (SCASD), 240 F.:1d 200. 217 (:1d Cir. 2001):
srr also Chambers v. Rabbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 106/l (D. Minn. 2001) (granting a
temporn.ry order allowing a student to wear a sweatshirt. displaying thl' message
"Straight Pride" in the absence of any disruption).
112. Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., :3H:1 F. Supp. 2d 96G (S.D. Ohio
200fi). The student had purchased the shirt at a church camp. The front of thl' shirt
rt>ad: "INTOLERANT. ,Jesus said ... I am the way, the truth and the life .•John 14:6.''
The following sentences wt>re on the hack of the shirt: "Homosexuality is a sin~ Islam is
a lie' Abortion is murder~ Some issues art> just black and whill• 1" !d. at 9(17.
11:1. Id. at 971.
111. Jd. at 97:1.
llG. Id. at 974.
116. ld.
117. ld.
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assertion no longer is true.
The Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion in 2006,
marking its second significant student expression decision
rendered within one month.118 In Harper u. Poway Unified
School District, the Ninth Circuit became the first appellate
court to rely primarily on Tinker's pronouncement that student
expression intruding on the rights of others can be curtailed.119
Applying this standard, the court upheld a California school
district's ban on students wearing T-shirts displaying
disparaging messages about homosexuality.12o The shirt at
issue included the following handwritten messages on the front
or back: "I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS
CONDEMNED;" "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED;" and "HOMOSEXUALITY
IS SHAMEFUL 'Romans 1:27."'121 The school involved had a
history of conflicts over issues pertaining to sexual orientation,
and much of the conflict seemed to center on the Gay-Straight
Alliance's annual "Day of Silence," which was intended to teach
tolerance regarding sexual orientation. 122 In 2003, some
students had organized a "Straight Pride Day" a week after the
"Day of Silence," during which they wore shirts displaying
derogatory remarks about homosexuals. The shirt that
generated the lawsuit was worn by Tyler Harper during the
2004 "Day of Silence" and on the following day.12:3 Even though
the school district did not have a written anti-harassment
policy, teachers and administrators felt that the words on the
student's shirt were inflammatory.l24 Harper was given
opportunities to remove the shirt, and after he refused, he was
not allowed to wear the shirt on campus. He was kept in the
office where he completed his work, but there was no
disciplinary action taken, and his record had no indication of

118. See Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
disciplinary action against a student for displaying a banner with the phrase "BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS" violated his clearly established expression rights). rev"d, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (2007) (upholding the disciplinary action for expression viewed as promoting
illegal activity); supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
119. 445 F.:3d 1166, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted and judgment vacated
v.:ith instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
120. Id. at 1178.
121. Id.atll7l.
122. I d.
123. I d.
124. Id. at 1172.
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the incident.125 Harper brought suit, the district court denied
his motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit
agreed.126
The appeals court relied on the second prong of Tinker,
finding that the derogatory statements constituted speech that
"'intrude[d] upon ... the rights of other students' or 'collide[d]
with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let
alone."'127 Indeed, the court held that "Harper's wearing of his
T-shirt 'collide[d] with the rights of other students' in the most
fundamental way," in that students have a right to be free from
attacks at school "on the basis of a core identifying
characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation."128
The court reasoned that the school was allowed to prohibit
Harper's conduct, regardless of the adoption of a valid antiharassment policy, as long as it could show that the restriction
was necessary to prevent a violation of the rights of other
students or a substantial disruption of school activities.129 The
court declared that speech can impinge on the rights of other
students under Tinker, even though the "speaker does not
directly accost individual students with his remarks,"J:HJ and
supported the school in banning the T-shirt that was "injurious
to gay and lesbian students and interfered with their right to
learn."131 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Third Circuit's
earlier suggestion in Saxe that injurious slurs interfering with
the rights of others cannot be barred unless they also are

12i'i. ld.
126. ld. at 117:), 1192.
127. ld. at 1177 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.. :;9:l U.S.
50:l. ;,oH (1969)). The court also rejected Harper's claim that the school's action in
banning his shirt ahridgt'd his free exercise of religion and violated the Establishment
Clause. Equal Protection Clause, and other protected rights. !d. at 1186-92.
12R. ld. at 1178: see also Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 20 I 11d. of
Educ .. :WCl7 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28172 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007) (denying students' rPquest
for a preliminary injunction to allow them to wear T-shirts, buttons, or sticket·s hearing
the phrase, "Be Happy, Not Gay," to express their opposition to homosexuality: school
authorities have a legitimate pedagogical reason to promote tolerance of diffprences
and to protect stud<mts from harassment); Governor WPntworth Reg'! Sch. Dist. v.
Hendrickson. 421 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D.N.H. 2006) (upholding suspension of a ga:-·
student for wearing an arm patch with a swastika and the intnnational "no" S\mbol
superimposed over it, given the friction lwtween gay stud<'nts and "redn<>cks" in the
school and administrators' need to promote safety).
l 29. Harper, 44f> F.:ld at 1175 n.1 l.
1>lO. !d. at ll77-7H.
1:n. !d. at llRO.
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disruptiveYl2
The Ninth Circuit specifically noted that because the free
speech claim was assessed based on Tinker, the court did not
have to consider whether Harper's expression was "plainly
offensive" and censorable under Fraser.l33 Thus, clarification of
the reach of Fraser was sidestepped by the Ninth Circuit in
Harper and subsequently by the Supreme Court in Morse as
well. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Morse noted that "the mode
of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear,"l:H but
whatever approach was used, the Fraser Court "certainly did
not conduct the 'substantial disruption' analysis prescribed by
Tinher."1:35
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harper
but vacated the appellate court ruling with instructions for the
appeal to be dismissed as moot.136 The Court relied on
precedent indicating that because the district court in Harper
had entered a final judgment dismissing the claims, the
Supreme Court could not render a decision on the merits of the
case.J:l7 Once again, the Court has left the volatile First
Amendment issues raised by anti-harassment restrictions to be
clarified another day.
V. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF ANTI-HARASSMENT PROVlSlO:\TS
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling pertaining to a
school district's anti-harassment policy or to the application of
unwritten restrictions in this regard, school authorities are left
to navigate a maze of conflicting lower court rulings in their
efforts to provide legal guidance to school boards in enacting
policies and to educators in implementing the provisions. Only
two generalizations can be offered with any confidence. First,
regardless of the type of restriction-anti-harassment policy,

1:12. !d. at 1179 n.21 (~iting Saxe v. State Col!. Area Sch. Dist. (SCASD), 240 F.:3d
200, 217 (:ld Cir. 20(ll)).
I :;:3. !d. at 1176 n.14.
J:l-!. l\1orse v. Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2GHl, 2G2G (2007).
1:J,'J. !d. at 2G27 (~iting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. S~h. Dist., 393 U.S. 50:1.
514 (1 %9)).
1:Hi. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 14H4 (2007), on remand, 485
F.:ld 1OG2 (9th Cir. 2007), appeal dismissed as moot pursuant tu instructions from the
Supreme Court.
1:l7. !d.
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dress code, or simply a school practice-constraints on student
expression that are discriminatorily applied will not survive
judicial scrutiny. If school authorities allow some clothing in a
banned category to be worn, but censor other items in the
category, or if they treat students differently for the same
expression, the aggrieved students will likely prevail.l38
Second, judicial guidance is fairly clear in situations where
there have been racial incidents or evidence of racial tension in
the school. Under these circumstances, courts have endorsed
anti-harassment policiesl39 and have upheld school authorities
in disciplining students for displays of Confederate flags or
other emblems associated with racial conflicts.l40
The guidance is much less clear where the relationship to
racial tension and school disruption is not apparent. Despite
the Sixth Circuit's recent statement that evidence of a
disruption is not required to prohibit Confederate flag
displays,l41 in cases to date where courts have upheld
prohibitions on racial harassment and racially charged
symbols, a connection to racial incidents usually has been
established.l42 Only the courts broadly interpreting the
discretion afforded to school authorities to curtail student
expressiOn under Fraser seem willing to accept school
authorities' restrictions on harassing expression without
evidence that such displays are likely to trigger a disruption.l43
Ambiguity surrounds whether a school district's adoption of
a written anti-harassment policy affects the case outcomes.
Some prohibitions on certain expression in public schools have
been upheld in light of a written policy, 144 whereas other

138. See, e.g, Castorina ex rei. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536,
541, 542, 544 (6th Cir. 2001); supra text accompanying not<e 94.
139. See, e.g., Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'] Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 265,
268 (3d Cir. 2002); supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
140. See, e.g, Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, :124 F.:od 124(), 1249 (11th Cir.
2003); supra text accompanying note 81.
141. D.B. ex rei. Brogdon v. Lafon, 217 Fed. Appx. fi 18, fi2fi (6th Cir. 2007); supra
text accompanying notes 91.
142. See, e.g, Scott, :324 F.:3d 1246, 1249: Sypniewshi. :HJ7 F.:3d at 247-49; West v.
Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F. 3d 1358. 1362 (lOth Cir. 2000).
143. See, e.g, Denno v. Sch. Bd. ofVolusia County, Fla .. 218 F.:3d 1267. 1273-74
(11th Cir. 2000) (applying the "flexible reasonableness'' standard drawn from Fraser);
supra text accompanying note 79.
144. See, e.r;., West, 20() F.::ld 1358, 1367-()8 (rejecting the plaintiffs facial
challenge to the school district's harassment policy by holding that the policy was not
vague or overbroad); supra text accompanying note 74.
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prohibitions have been upheld without reference to such a
policy.l45 In some instances students have prevailed in
expressing their views because challenged policies have been
considered vague or overbroad, 146 whereas other students have
successfully challenged censorship action that is not pursuant
to a written anti-harassment policy.147 Since cases are not
turning on the presence or absence of a written policy-and
such policies can increase legal challenges to the wording
selected-some school districts might try to avoid overbreadth
claims by operating without anti-harassment policies. In short,
school authorities may question the wisdom of enacting an
anti-harassment policy that might increase their legal
vulnerability when they may be able to prohibit the targeted
expression without one. However, other school authorities may
prefer to enact such policies, which embody values the district
is attempting to promote, to provide a useful guide for
students, parents, and others involved m the school
community.14H
It is also unclear whether anti-harassment aspects of dress
codes evoke less judicial scrutiny than do constraints on
expression in more general anti-harassment policies; some
restrictions on harassing attire in dress codes have been upheld
whereas others have been invalidated.149 Nonetheless, school
authorities may decide that they can avoid controversies over
harassing clothing by adopting very prescriptive dress codes or
perhaps student uniforms, which are becoming increasingly

14i). Sec, e.g, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.:ld 1166. 1175 n.ll (9th
Cir. 2006) (deciding not to make "even a preliminary judgment as to the
constitutionality" of the school's anti-harassment policy); supra text accompanying note
119.
l4G. See, e.g. Saxe v. State Coli. Area Sch. Dist. (SCASD), 240 F.3d 200, 214-15
(3d Cir. 2001): supra text accompanying note :39.
14 7. Sec, e.g .. Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., :3H:l F. Supp. 2d 9fi:) (S.D.
Ohio 200:1): supra text accompanying note 112.
141-l. It should he noted that half the states have enacted anti-bullying laws that
prohibit certain student behavior in public schools, usually overt, repeated acts or
gestun•s intended to harass, intimidate, ridicule, humiliate, or harm another studpnt.
Sec National Conference of State Legislatures, School Bullyinl{ Overview. Mar. 2007.
ami/able
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/bullyingoverview.htm.
Also.
professional education associations are focusing considerable attention on technologyuse policies to curtail cyberhullying. See Erin Uy, Cyherbullying Boom Elicits New
School Internet Guidelines, EDUC. DAlLY, Jan. 25, 2008, at 2.
149. Compare D. B. ex rei. Brogdon v. Lafon, 217 Fed. Appx. 518 (6th Cir. 2007),
with Bragg v. Swanson, :171 F. Supp. 2d H14 (S.D. W. Va. 2005): supra text
accompan:-;ing notes 87 and I 04.
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popular in urban districts.l50 As long as the policies are not
adopted to suppress student expression, courts have upheld
restrictive dress codes and student uniform requirements
designed to advance legitimate educational goals, such as
increasing the focus on learning, reducing the presence of gang
symbols, and neutralizing socioeconomic distinctions.Ji'il It
remains to be seen whether recent mixed results in litigation
challenging anti-harassment policies will encourage school
districts to mask some anti-harassment provisions in very
restrictive dress codes (e.g., barring clothing with any writing
or symbols).
Particularly ambiguous are the legal principles governing
religious challenges to anti-harassment policies that bar
demeaning expression based on sexual orientation. These
controversies are especially troublesome because of the
important competing interests at stake-the protection of
religious expression and the protection of vulnerable minority
groups from harassment. Indeed, some unusual coalitions have
formed (e.g., conservative citizen groups and civil libertarians)
to assert students' rights to voice their religious objections to
homosexuality and to challenge school districts' antiharassment policies that prevent such expression.l52
Countering these assertions, public schools contend that they
have not only the authority, but also the duty, to promote civil
behavior and expression and to protect vulnerable students
from classmates' hurtful expression.l5.3
150. Debra Nussbaum, Any Color You Lihe, as Lonf.[ as It's Black. N.Y. TJ\IJ-:,.;. Feb.
19. 2006, at 6.
151. See, e.g., Blau v. Ft. Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.::ld ::l81, :398-400 (fith Cir.
200fi) (prohibiting, among other things, baggy or revealing clothing; tops and bottoms
that do not overlap; visible body piercing other than ears; clothing that is distn·ssed or
has holes; flip-flop sandals or high platform shoes; pants. shorts. or skirts that are not
solid navy. black. khaki. or white; tops with writing on them and logos largn than the
size of a quarter. except for the school's logo; and tops that are not a solid color):
Littlefield v. Forney lndep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 2HO (5th Cir. 2001) (n·quiring
students to wear specific types of shirts or blouses of particular colors with blue or
khaki pants, shorts, skirts, or jumpers; specifying that clothing be made of specific
materials; requiring certain types of shoes; and prohibiting any clothing suggesting
gang affiliation). School districts mandating student uniforms may he n•quirecl to
include mechanisms for requesting waivers, and make provisions for students who
cannot afford to purchase the uniforms. For cases involving school uniforms. see
Wilkins v. Penns Grove-Carneys Point Reg'! Sch. Dist., 12:3 Fed. Appx. 4~J:l (:ld Cir.
200fi); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 4:37 (fith Cir. 2001).
lfi2. See Andrew Trotter, Justice:; Differ Sharply on Student Speech. EIHJ<'. WEEK,
Mar. 2R, 2007, at 20-2.3.
1fi:l. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bel. of Alachua County. :J24 F.:ld 1246. 124!-l (11th Cir.
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Assuming that the Supreme Court does eventually accept a
Harper-type case, the outcome of the Court's deliberations is
very difficult to predict. Justices Alito and Kennedy might side
with the students asserting a right to air religious views about
homosexuality, given their concurrence in the recent Morse
decision.154 They emphasized that they were joining the Morse
majority in upholding the school board's disciplinary action
against the student only if the Court's opinion was limited to
curtailing expression that promotes illegal drugs.l Pi5 According
to these justices, student comments about "any political or
social issue" cannot be censored by school authorities unless
disruptive.156 Given that Justice Alito authored the Saxe
decision striking down an anti-harassment policy challenged as
inhibiting religious speech, 157 he seems especially likely to side
with those asserting a First Amendment right to air their
religious views, despite such expression offending some
classmates. However, Justice Kennedy's position is more
difficult to predict from the opinions he has authored.158
Justice Thomas would probably side with the school district in
creating and implementing anti-harassment policies. Even
though he supports greater accommodation of religion in public
schools,159 it would be difficult for him to endorse an expansion
of students' expression rights, given his very strong statement
in his Morse concurrence that public school students have no
First Amendment expression rights at all.160
The positions of the other Supreme Court justices are much

2003); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Vol usia County, Fla., 218 F.:3d 12(i7. 1:21:1 (11th Cir. 2000);
West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 23 F. Supp. 2d 122:\. 12:l:l (D. Kan. 1998); see
also supra note 148.
154. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (A\ ito, .J., joined by Kennedy,
J., concurring).

155.

Id.

156. See id.
157. Saxe v. State Coli. Area Sch. Dist. (SCASlJ), 240 F.:ld 200 (:3d Cir. 2001);
supra text accompanying notes :39-55.
158. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in I~awrence u. Texas, 5:39 U.S.
558 (2003) (invalidating a state law that demeaned the existence of homosexuals and
their right to engage in private sexual conduct). Thus, an argument might be made
that he would side with school authorities in supporting ant i-han1ssment restrictions
pertaining to sexual orientation in a Harper-type case.
159. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 5:3:3 U.S. D8 (2001) (holding that
because the school allowed some community groups to usP its facilities, it had to grant
access immediately after school for an evangelical religious group to hold devotional
meetings targeting elementary-age students who attended the school).
160. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 26:30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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more ambiguous and will likely depend on how individual
justices balance their commitments to 1) the protection of
student expression, including religious expression; 2) deference
to local school authorities in making decisions regarding what
constitutes civil behavior and expression; and 3) instilling
respect for diversity among public school students.H51 It is
possible that a decision on the merits of a Harper-type case will
not reflect the conservative and liberal justices voting in blocks
as has often been evident.162 In fact, some civil libertarians
may be conflicted over whether to champion students' rights to
express disparaging sentiments about homosexuality or to side
with the school m protecting captive students from
harassment.
It is too soon to conclude that other courts will adopt the
Ninth Circuit's reliance on the second prong of Tinker in
holding that demeaning expression based on sexual orientation
unconstitutionally interferes with the rights of others. Yet,
there is considerable support for such an outcome, given that
public schools have an important role in cultivating the "habits
and manners of civility"16:3 essential in a democracy and that
"schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized
social order."164 Also, there is widespread interest in
preventing student bullying because of its connection to school
violence.165 Many educators as well as legal commentators
have assumed that the important obligations of public schools
in instilling basic values, such as respect for others with
different backgrounds and beliefs, must override students'

Hil. Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg have dissc>nted both in cases
curtailing the protection of student expression and prohibiting school distt·icts from
using race in student assignment plans. See Morse. 127 S. Ct. at :w:JS-4:3 ( Brc·~·er. .J..
concurring in part, dissenting in part): id. at 2n4 7 (Stevens. ,J., joined b:.· Souter.
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (supporting students' rights to express non-disruptive views
in school and at school-sponsored events): Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1. 127 S. Ct. 27:38, 2800 (2007) (Breyer .•J., joined bv Steve>ns, Souter.
Ginsburg. JJ .. dissenting) (voicing support for advancing diversity in public oc:hoo\s).
162. See, e.g, majority and dissenting opinions in Parents lnuolued in Cmty. Sch ..
127 S. Ct. 27:lH: Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2G I H: sec also Linda Greenhouse, The Kennedy
Factor on the Hoherts Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. :n, 200(), ~ 4, at 2: .Jeffrey Toohin. The
Tall! of the Town: Fiue to Four. NEWYOI\KEH, June 2fi. 2007, at :l;,,
w:1. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:1 v. Frasc·r, 47H U.S. fi7fi, G81 (I !-JHfi).
Hi4. Id. at GH:o.
I Gfi. See ROilEWJ' FEI:--J, BilYAN VOSSEKUIL, WILLIAM POLLA!'K, RANDY BOIWM.
WIUJA!\1 MODZELESKI & MAl\ ISA REDDY. THREAT ASSESSI\IE:--JT I;\; SCHOOLS: A (;l!IDE TO
l\!L\:--J.\(;]:-.JG THRK·\TE:--JI:-.JG SITUATIO:-.JS A:--JD TO CI\EATI:--JG SM'E SCHOOL CLI~L'.TES
(2002); see also supra note 14il.
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interests in expressing some views in public schools.166
Consistently, and most recently in Morse, the Supreme
Court has considered the public school a special environment
where the rights of students are not coextensive with those of
adults elsewhere.167 It might follow that a majority of the
Supreme Court justices will uphold an anti-harassment
provision that protects groups of students from ridicule by
classmates. Yet, there are compelling First Amendment rights
that also must be considered.l68

VI. CONCLUSION
Currently, educators understandably are insecure m
balancing public schools' obligations and students' rights in
terms of appropriate and protected expression in public schools.
The Supreme Court's prior rulings have not yielded clear legal
principles to guide the lower courts in this regard. Without
such guidance, the lower courts have not developed much
consistency to inform school administrators as to how far they
may go in setting anti-harassment standards. And the
Supreme Court declined the opportunity to clarify the law in
this arena in Harper. Thus, how to balance these important
concerns in protecting students from hurtful and demeaning
expression against the competing interests in encouraging
students to freely express their views remains a vexing
challenge, and one that the Supreme Court is not likely to
resolve soon.
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